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Abstract 
This paper considers developments in UK growth performance and supply-side policies since the 
1980s.  It argues that economic reforms made in the Thatcher years and consolidated under 
subsequent governments delivered improved pre-crisis growth outcomes helped by the ICT 
revolution and stronger competition in product markets.  The new growth economics provided 
useful insights for policymakers some of which were partly heeded.  Recently, as productivity growth 
has stalled, there has been a turn to ‘soft’ industrial policy and a fear that the future is one of secular 
stagnation.  The former has made little difference and the latter is unlikely. 
Keywords: endogenous growth; ICT revolution; UK industrial policy; productivity puzzle; secular 
stagnation 
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I. Introduction 
Economic growth remains a major policy objective.  Growth is central to achieving rising living 
standards whether directly by raising incomes or indirectly through facilitating a better quality of 
life.  Sustained growth of labour productivity which is the key ingredient is driven by investment in 
various types of capital and by innovation.  In the medium- and long-term, insofar as government 
can influence the growth rate, it is supply-side policies that matter.  For guidance about the design of 
these policies, growth economics is the natural starting point. 
Over the last 30 years, much has changed in terms both of the way economists think about 
economic growth and also the context in which the UK economy operates.  The advent of 
endogenous-growth economics has focused attention on the micro-foundations of productivity 
performance.  This not only means that the scope for policy to affect the long-run growth rate is 
made explicit but also that the range of relevant policies is wider than was recognized by the 
informal growth economics of the 1970s.  Today’s policymakers are working in an economy which 
has de-industrialized quite remarkably, participates in an era of much greater globalization, faces 
challenges from the rise of China and is deep into the ICT revolution.  (Mutually incompatible) 
spectres such as secular stagnation and the mass computerization of employment seem to mount 
serious new challenges. 
Against this background, I will review how ideas about and policies towards growth have evolved 
since the mid-1980s and I will draw some lessons from this experience.  An important focal point will 
be the role of ‘industrial policy’ in its various guises (‘selective’, ‘horizontal’ and ‘soft’).  Then, 
unprofessionally for an economic historian, I will allow myself some speculations about the future. 
II. Emerging Themes in the Mid-1980s 
The most obvious feature of the mid-1980s was the growing realization of a ‘new normal’, namely, 
that growth had slowed down permanently in OECD countries following the Golden Age which had 
ended by the mid-1970s (Matthews, 1982).  This ‘new normal’ is reflected in the difference in 
growth rates between the periods 1950-73 and 1973-95 which is reported in Table 1.  A well-known 
growth accounting exercise by Maddison (1987) interpreted the post-1973 slowdown as largely 
explicable in terms of the end of a period of rapid catch-up growth which reduced the scope for 
productivity advance in Europe.  However, neither Maddison nor Denison (1985) was able to 
account for the majority of the slowdown in the United States which represented the key 
’productivity puzzle’ of the period.  This was made all the more mysterious by the ‘Solow 
productivity paradox’ that 'you can see the computer age everywhere except in the productivity 
statistics'.1  So, in one important respect, there was some considerable uncertainty about the new 
normal in terms of the future contribution to productivity growth from technological progress in the 
leading economy. 
If policymakers were discouraged by an environment in which growth would be slower, they could 
be encouraged by the advent of the ‘new growth economics’.2 Hitherto, formal growth theory had 
been dominated by the neoclassical growth model in which long-run productivity growth was a 
                                                          
1
 This famous quip was made by Robert Solow in July of 1987, see Triplett (1999). 
2
 Or, in Gordon Brown’s infamous phrase, they could be thrilled by ‘post-neoclassical endogenous growth’. 
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result of exogenous technological change and changes in the investment rate only affected the level 
of output per person rather than its growth rate.  The key feature of the endogenous growth models 
which appeared during the 1980s was that they made long-run growth rates a result of investment 
decisions (relating to a broad concept of capital) based on microeconomic foundations.  Two 
different types of model were developed, namely, AK models of growth in which diminishing returns 
to (broad) capital accumulation were assumed away and endogenous innovation models in which 
the rate of technological progress is a result of profit-seeking investments.   Two well-known variants 
of the former type were eventually published as Romer (1986), based on constant returns to 
physical capital, and Lucas (1988) where endogenous growth could be the result of human and 
physical capital accumulation combined, with the former generating externalities.  Both these 
papers circulated for some years before publication.  Two well-known variants of the latter type 
were the quality-ladders approach of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and the Schumpeterian growth 
model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) which was first drafted in 1987.   
The relevance of both these types of models is that well-designed supply-side policy can have 
positive growth-rate effects, rather than just levels effects as in the neoclassical growth model.  It 
should be noted, however, that growth rate effects might also result from adverse implications of 
uncertainty and volatility of demand for investment and the traditional assumption that trend 
growth was independent of business cycle fluctuations was not necessarily valid (Ramey and Ramey, 
1995).  In the mid-1980s, however, the policy implications of the new growth economics were still 
quite unclear. 
Empirical analysis of economic growth was also changing in the 1980s as new data sets became 
available, notably an early version of what became very well-known estimates of long-run real 
income levels for OECD economies (Maddison, 1982) and a much improved version of the Penn 
World Tables (Summers and Heston, 1984).  These permitted more sophisticated international 
comparisons of performance and underpinned a huge growth regressions literature.  Notions such 
as ‘conditional β-convergence’ (Barro, 1991) and ‘social capability’ for catch-up and convergence 
(Abramovitz, 1986) were developed as attempts were made to examine the roles that institutions 
and policies had played in growth outcomes.  In turn, this would provide a new framework in which 
to interpret British relative economic decline. 
Relative economic decline was, of course, being addressed in the 1980s by the radical reforms of 
supply-side policies introduced by the Thatcher governments which had departed from the ‘post-
war consensus’ on economic policy which had prevailed for the previous three decades.  The new 
policies included de-regulation - notably in the financial sector, restructuring of taxation, 
privatization, reductions in benefits and subsidies, and reforms to industrial relations.  Attempts to 
slow down de-industrialization were largely abandoned and efficiency was prioritized relative to 
equity.  Crucially, the de-facto ‘trade-union veto’ on policy reform was ended.  By the mid-1980s, it 
seemed possible that the Thatcher Experiment was delivering improved productivity performance 
but the economic rationale and effectiveness of the reforms were controversial (Crafts, 1988).  
Moreover, even in the early 1990s, it was unclear whether following the next election many of these 
policies would be reversed and whether they had delivered a levels effect or a growth rate effect 
(Crafts, 1991). 
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The 1980s saw the rejection of selective industrial policy as promulgated in the 1960s and 1970s 
through protectionism, nationalization, promotion of national champions which had deservedly got 
a bad name.  Commentators who were by no means against government intervention in principle 
concluded that policy appeared to be "directed at helping old industries to survive rather than 
encouraging new products and new technology" (Silberston, 1981, p. 49) and that, although 'picking 
winners' may have been the aspiration, "it was losers like Rolls Royce, British Leyland and Alfred 
Herbert who picked Ministers" (Morris and Stout, 1985, p. 873).  So, in the mid-1980s industrial 
policy was being downsized in a big way and moving to a mostly horizontal basis.  Critics worried 
that the pendulum had swung too far and that the new policy stance would expose Britain to a 
dangerous unbalancing away from manufacturing (Krugman, 1987; House of Lords, 1991). 
III. What did 1980s’ Economists and Policymakers Get Right or Wrong? 
As is reflected in Table 1, the mid-1980s’ consensus view that the Golden Age of economic growth 
was over and that growth rates would no longer match those of the 1950s and 1960s was basically 
correct.  That said, the medium-term outcome for the UK was relatively favourable in that labour 
productivity growth between 1973 and 2007 was not greatly reduced from the pre-1973 rate.  
Growth slowed down much more in France and Germany so there was a relative improvement in 
British performance which was not widely anticipated. 
The productivity slowdown in the United States, which was at its most acute in the early 1980s, gave 
way to a strong burst of productivity growth around the turn of the century.  The slowdown is still 
not well understood today but we can say that the Solow Paradox has been resolved and ICT has 
turned out to be a strong General Purpose Technology (GPT) in terms of its productivity impact, as is 
shown by the comparisons with the two most famous earlier GPTs in Table 2.  To place the 
chronology in perspective, it is worth noting that James Watt’s steam engine was patented in 1769, 
Thomas Edison first distributed electrical power to customers in New York in 1882, and the Intel 
4004 microprocessor was introduced in 1971.   
Table 2 reveals both that the impact of ICT has been relatively large and also that it has come 
through very quickly.  This new GPT is unprecedented in its rate of technological progress, reflected 
in the speed and magnitude of the price falls in ICT equipment reported in Table 1.  Faster price falls 
imply a larger and more rapid adoption of the ICT capital equipment in which the new technology is 
embodied which feeds through into the ICT-capital deepening component.  Even so, the arithmetic 
of growth accounting immediately reveals that the initial effect of new general purpose technologies 
such as steam and ICT will be modest simply because β and η are very small in the early days.  In the 
context of Solow Paradox, it is worth noting that by historical standards the growth contribution of 
ICT in the late 1980s was already quite stunning – the true paradox is why people apparently 
expected so much more. 
The body of empirical evidence with which to assess the new growth economics is now massive 
compared with the mid-1980s.  The detail of how supply-side policy affects the profitability of 
investment decisions with at least short-term growth effects is now much clearer and the basic 
predictions of the new growth economics find some support.  For example, reforming taxation with 
a view to increasing the growth rate would generally entail reducing marginal direct tax rates and 
increasing indirect and property taxes and can have non-trivial effects over a 10 year period 
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(Johansson et al., 2008).  Investment in public capital has positive effects on real GDP, where an 
output elasticity of about 0.2 is a reasonable assumption, and also ‘crowds in’ private capital in the 
medium term (Kamps, 2005a).  This estimate underpins a calculation that to maintain the level of 
public capital to GDP at a growth-maximizing level, public investment of about 2.7 per cent of GDP 
per year given a reasonable estimate of potential growth in the UK (Kamps, 2005b). 
It is now clear, however, that the implications of AK models are not consistent with the data, as has 
been emphasized in several major reviews of the literature (Acemoglu, 2009, ch. 11; Durlauf et al., 
2005; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005).  The discrepancies include strong evidence in favour of β-
convergence across the OECD countries, the post-1973 growth slowdown not being accompanied by 
significant declines in broad capital accumulation, the small coefficients on investment rates in 
growth regressions, the small size of estimated externalities to human capital accumulation, and the 
fact that TFP differences are far more important than factor inputs in accounting for cross-country 
variation in output per person.3  Capital accumulation makes an important contribution to growth, 
as growth accounting underlines (cf. Table 4), but it is not the ’engine of growth’ as envisaged by AK 
models. 
Similarly, investigations of the impact of trade liberalization do not match the predictions of the AK 
model.  For example, Badinger (2005) found that European economic integration has had a sizeable 
impact on the level of income but has not had a permanent effect on the rate of growth.  This is in 
line with recent investigations of the impact of trade liberalizations using difference-in-differences 
approaches (Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2013) but goes against the hopeful predictions of some 
economists in the 1980s.4 
With regard to endogenous-innovation growth models, the basic idea of endogenous innovation 
remains appealing but it is dubious whether the claim of fully endogenous growth can be sustained.  
One obvious piece of evidence against this proposition is the failure of OECD growth to accelerate 
despite large increases in R & D expenditure (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 2005).  The evidence is 
potentially consistent with an interpretation of American growth as being largely underpinned over 
the post World War II period by a succession of transitory effects resulting from increases in human-
capital and research intensities (Fernald and Jones, 2014). 
There is, however, plenty of evidence that innovative effort does respond to profit incentives and 
that the notion of endogenizing TFP growth is plausible.  The ability to appropriate returns matters 
and is achieved by a variety of imperfections in competition (Granstrand, 2006), increased market 
size stimulates innovation as theory suggests (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004), and R & D responds to 
price signals as in the case of energy efficiency and energy prices (Popp, 2002).  There is consensus in 
the literature that R and D has a strong impact on TFP growth (with an elasticity of perhaps 0.15). 
                                                          
3
 For example, a recent exercise found that real GDP per person in the EU27 + EFTA countries was 64.7 per 
cent of the USA level in 2005, compared with human capital intensity at 91.2 per cent, physical capital intensity 
at 114.1 per cent, labour inputs per person at 91.3 per cent and TFP at 67.8 per cent of the USA level (Duval 
and de la Maisonneuve, 2009). 
4
 For example, Baldwin (1989) argued that the Cecchini Report could be massively underestimating the impact 
of the European Single Market because the static efficiency it expected would raise the output to capital ratio, 
and hence for any given savings rate the growth of the capital stock, and thus (in a constant-returns setting) 
the growth of GDP perhaps by as much as 0.9 percentage points per year.  Sadly, this does not seem to have 
been the outcome. 
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Similarly, the diffusion of new technology is strongly influenced by absorptive capacity of firms and 
the profitability of adoption (Geroski, 2000).5  Accordingly, the international evidence is that the 
diffusion of ICT has been significantly inhibited in countries which have lower educational 
attainment and which are heavily regulated (Cette and Lopez, 2012).  Employment protection has 
been shown to deter investment in ICT equipment (Gust and Marquez, 2004) because it increases 
the costs of reorganizing working practices and upgrading the labour force, which are central to 
realizing the productivity potential of ICT (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003). 
Endogenous innovation models are ambivalent about the impact of competition on innovation. 
There is the classic ‘Schumpeterian’ argument was that ex-ante market power encourages 
innovation because it enhances the expected appropriability of profits.  Against this is the ‘Hicksian’ 
possibility that market power allows management to be sleepy and the point that firms gain more 
from innovating in an industry which is competitive ex-ante if profits are perfectly appropriable ex-
post.  A combination of Hicks and Schumpeter might suggest that the relationship between market 
power and innovation has an inverted-U shape.  A sophisticated variant of these arguments has 
proposed that entry threats encourage innovation by firms close to the technological frontier who 
can protect their rents but discourage innovation by firms far from the frontier who will succumb to 
entry whether or not they innovate (Aghion and Howitt, 1992).  Econometric analysis found that in 
the 1970s and 1980s greater competition increased innovation in the UK (Blundell et al., 1999; 
Geroski, 1990).  Good competition policy has had a strong impact on TFP growth in OECD countries 
(Buccirossi et al., 2013).  There is also evidence of an inverted U-shape in the relationship between 
market power and patenting with the peak at a low price-cost margin (Aghion et al., 2005).  Foreign-
firm entry in the UK following trade liberalization has resulted in increased patenting and 
productivity growth but only in industries close to the technology frontier (Aghion et al., 2009). 
The striking result here which was not well understood in the mid-1980s is that strengthening 
competition can promote growth.  Substantial support for this proposition has accumulated since 
then but the rationale may be more general than that above.  A powerful line of argument is that 
competition is an effective antidote to principal-agent problems within firms that involve managers 
whose interests are imperfectly aligned with owners with adverse effects on productivity.  In this 
context, weak shareholders find competition helpful in devising contracts that incentivize managers 
while competition also raises the sensitivity of profits to managerial actions (Nickell, 1996).  
Additionally, product market competition reduces slack and acts as a disciplinary device fostering the 
adoption of new technology.  In an endogenous growth setting this has growth rate effects (Aghion 
et al., 1997).  Nickell et al. (1997) found that a fall of supernormal profits from 15 to 5 per cent of 
value added raised TFP growth by 1 percentage point in UK firms without a dominant external 
shareholder but had no significant effect where there was such a shareholding.  Moreover, 
competition promotes good management practices which pay off in improved productivity 
outcomes (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). 
The hypothesis that volatility can harm growth has been somewhat controversial.  One reason for 
this is that models were produced that had the opposite prediction, namely, that larger and more 
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 Absorptive capacity entails the ability to search for, evaluate, assimilate, and exploit knowledge. This is 
underpinned by education and skills but also by investments in intangible capital including crucially R&D 
(Griffith et al., 2004) but also economic competences including training, flexibility in use of business models, 
effective cooperation with research organizations, and organizational capabilities (Harris and Moffat, 2013). 
6 
 
frequent business-cycle fluctuations can raise growth, for example, since the opportunity cost of 
productivity enhancing activities falls in recessions (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998) and conflicting 
results have been found in empirical work (Lin and Kim, 2014).  Nevertheless, the preponderance of 
evidence points fairly clearly to a negative effect on growth of unexpected volatility, uncertainty, or 
the variance of innovations to a forecasting equation for growth (Bloom, 2014; Rafferty, 2005; 
Ramey and Ramey, 1995) and this implies that a well-designed macroeconomic policy framework 
could be beneficial for long-run growth outcomes. 
In sum, it is reasonable now to think that, despite its laughing-stock status in Punch-and-Judy 
politics, ‘post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory’ offers important insights into the way supply-
side policy can be designed to promote productivity growth over the medium term.  The main thrust 
is that growth depends on investment in tangible and intangible capital, in education and training, 
and on innovation.  Decisions to invest and innovate respond to economic incentives such that well-
designed policy which addresses market failures can raise the growth rate a bit.  This implies that 
governments need to pay attention to making investments that complement private sector capital 
accumulation, for example in infrastructure, to supporting activities like education and research and 
development where social returns exceed private returns, to avoiding the imposition of high 
marginal direct tax rates, to recognising that regulations can undermine productivity, and to 
fostering competitive pressure on management to develop and adopt cost-effective innovations. 
Table 3 reports modern evidence on British relative economic decline.  This confirms the seriousness 
of growth underperformance during the 1950s through the 1970s but it also shows that this was no 
longer the case from the 1980s to the eve of the crisis in 2007.  By that year, real GDP per person 
was about the same as in West Germany and ahead of France and it seemed reasonable to argue 
that relative economic decline vis-à-vis these countries had ended.  The shortfall compared with 
France and Germany in capital deepening and TFP contributions to labour productivity growth 
largely disappeared (Table 4).  A productivity-level gap still remained but this was offset by higher 
levels of employment and longer hours worked while labour productivity growth was noticeably 
stronger in the UK after the mid-1990s (cf. Table 1).  It seems fair to say that this outcome was 
better than was generally expected in the mid-1980s. 
The acceleration in American productivity growth after 1995 was underpinned by ICT.  Since the 
main impact of ICT on economic growth comes through its use as a new form of capital equipment, 
the development of this new general purpose technology gave Europe a great opportunity to raise 
productivity growth but most countries have been less successful in responding than the United 
States.  However, the UK did benefit more than most, as is reflected in Table 5.  ICT has had 
considerable potential to improve productivity growth in some service sectors, especially finance 
and distribution, and relatively good UK productivity performance after 1995 was based on a strong 
contribution from market services. 
The diffusion of ICT has been aided by complementary investments in intangible capital and in high-
quality human capital and relatively light regulation of labour and product markets.  Expansion of 
higher education  helped the UK but especially notable is a strong volume of investment in intangible 
capital (including software, innovative property, economic competencies of businesses) which 
amounted to 10.5 per cent of market sector GDP in 2006 compared with 7.2 per cent in Germany 
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and 8.0 per cent in France (van Ark et al., 2009).6  For the UK, the 1980s’ de-regulation of services 
that are intensive in the use of ICT (notably finance and retailing), which reduced barriers to entry, 
and reform of industrial relations was important for its relatively successful response to the new 
technology.  Investment in ICT is much more profitable and has a bigger productivity payoff if it is 
accompanied by organizational change in working and management practices (Crespi et al., 2007).  
This would not have happened with 1970s-style industrial relations in conditions of weak 
competition.  For example, Prais (1981, pp. 198-199) noted the egregious example of the newspaper 
industry where these conditions precluded the introduction of electronic equipment in Fleet Street 
although an investment of £50 million could have reduced costs by £35 million per year. 
Putting this recent experience into longer-run perspective, two points deserve to be made.  First, 
Britain has been relatively good at the diffusion of ICT in market services whereas in the earlier 
postwar period it was relatively bad at the diffusion of Fordist techniques in manufacturing.  This 
makes the point that relative social capability is not independent of the technological epoch.  
Second, success in ICT diffusion was an unintended and unexpected consequence of economic 
reforms in the Thatcher period. 
Since the 1970s, government policy has moved in the general direction of substantially increasing 
competition in product markets, initially through abandoning protectionism, then through de-
regulation and finally through strengthening competition policy.  There is no doubt that this had a 
significant effect in improving productivity performance (Crafts, 2012).7  The impact was felt at least 
partly through greater pressure on management to perform and through firm-worker bargains 
which raised effort and improved working practices.  For example, increases in competition resulting 
from the European Single Market raised both the level and growth rate of TFP in plants which were 
part of multi-plant firms and thus most prone to agency problems (Griffith, 2001).  Trade union 
membership and bargaining power were seriously eroded. This was prompted partly by high 
unemployment and anti-union legislation in the 1980s but also owed a good deal to increased 
competition (Brown et al., 2008).  The 1980s saw a surge in productivity growth in unionized firms as 
organizational change took place under pressure of competition (Machin and Wadhwani, 1989) and 
de-recognition of unions in the context of increases in foreign competition had a strong effect on 
productivity growth in the late 1980s (Gregg et al., 1993).  The productivity payoff was boosted by 
the interaction of reforms to industrial relations and product-market competition; this was another 
pleasant surprise. 
Selective industrial policy stayed out of favour and spending on horizontal policies was greatly 
reduced by the removal of most investment and employment subsidies.  This was partly because the 
1970s experience led to disillusionment and partly because international treaties and, in particular, 
EU rules on state aids constrained policy.  DTI expenditure on industrial policy measures was £421.4 
million in 1997/8 (prior to devolution) of which £121.9 million was on science and technology 
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 Growth accounting techniques can be modified to include a contribution from intangible capital.  This also 
entails modifying the definition of output and revising factor shares and means that residual TFP growth 
changes.  If this is done, the post-1995 UK had notably higher productivity growth contributions than either 
France or Germany from each of ICT capital deepening, intangible capital deepening and TFP (van Ark et al., 
2009). 
7
 The impact of increased competition resulting from joining the European Economic Community was far 
greater than anyone foresaw ex ante (Crafts, 2015a). 
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schemes, £171.3 million for support for small firms, and £128.2 million on regional policy, almost all 
of which went on Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) (Wren, 2001).  Whereas in 1981/6 state aids 
were 3.8 per cent of manufacturing GDP by 1994/6 this had fallen to 0.9 per cent.  Virtually all (91%) 
of state aid in 2006 was for horizontal rather than selective policies (Buigues and Sekkat, 2011). 
When Labour won a landslide victory in the 1997 election, it was possible to wonder whether in 
government it would revert to 'Old Labour' policies.  The answer soon became apparent and was a 
resounding 'No'.  1970s-style policy was conspicuous by its absence: there was no nationalization 
programme, no move to subsidize manufacturing investment, no counterpart of the National 
Enterprise Board, no return to high marginal rates of direct tax, no attempt to resist de-
industrialization by supporting declining industries, and no major reversal of industrial relations 
reform. Implicitly, the Thatcher supply-side reforms had been accepted.  The changes that Labour 
made were to strengthen some aspects of horizontal industrial policies with a new emphasis on 
education, R & D, investing in public capital, and strengthening competition policy.  This was further 
fine-tuning of reforms to make a ’liberal market economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) work better. 
New Labour also emphasized the importance of stability based on a predictable policy framework as 
conducive to better growth performance and saw the delegation of monetary policy to the Bank of 
England and its fiscal rules as delivering this (HM Treasury, 2002).  The ‘Great Moderation’ period 
was characterized by very significant reductions in macroeconomic uncertainty and this was 
probably favourable for pre-crisis growth performance.  However, this seems to have owed more to 
good luck, in the shape of a more benign economic environment, than to good policy (Benati, 2008).  
Notably, a dog that didn’t bark was a financial crisis although the financial liberalization of the 1980s 
and subsequent evolution of banking had considerably increased the economy’s exposure to this risk 
(ICB, 2011). 
IV. How Have Perceptions of the Issues Changed? 
On the eve of the crisis, the growth performance of the UK economy was generally seen as quite 
satisfactory (Van Reenen, 2013).  A long period of relative economic decline vis-à-vis other European 
economies seemed to have come to an end under the auspices of the supply-side policies initiated 
under the Thatcher government and continued in most respects by New Labour.  Subsequent 
developments have come as a rude shock; in 2014 quarter 2, real GDP per person was still only at 
98.2 per cent of the previous peak level in 2008 quarter 1 while real GDP per hour worked at the end 
of 2013 was about 16 per cent below what would have been expected on the basis of its pre-crisis 
trend (Barnett et al., 2014).  This new ‘productivity puzzle’ raises questions about the continued 
viability of the ‘post-Thatcher consensus’. 
Several new issues have emerged since 2007.  First, in the aftermath of the worst financial crisis 
since the 19th century, the ‘productivity puzzle’ surely reflects a permanent and sizeable adverse 
effect on the level of potential output but may provoke some scepticism as to whether pre-2007 
trend growth is sustainable.8  Second, the crisis has also reawakened 1980s’ concerns about the 
structure of the UK economy as to whether the financial sector had become too big and 
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 It is generally agreed that serious financial crises reduce the level of potential output although by how much 
is debateable.  There is no strong evidence that post-crisis trend growth is reduced but the transition period 
while the levels effect materializes may be quite long (IMF, 2009).   
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manufacturing too small so that ‘rebalancing’ of the economy should become a policy priority.  
Third, in the context of slow growth and an ‘unbalanced’ economy, a fundamental re-design of 
industrial policy started to be discussed for the first time in a generation.  Fourth, it has become 
increasingly apparent that a new industrial policy will have to contend with a more globalized world 
economy and, in particular, the so-called ‘2nd Unbundling’ which has resulted from the ICT revolution 
(Baldwin, 2012). 
The estimates in Table 1 illustrate the ‘productivity puzzle’ with growth in real GDP per hour worked 
averaging -0.51 over the years 2007-13.  Estimates by The Conference Board (2014) suggest that the 
key culprit in growth accounting terms was TFP growth which averaged -1.36 per cent per year but 
was partly offset by continued capital-deepening.  This raises the question of the extent to which 
negative productivity growth over these recent years reflects a one-time adjustment to a lower level 
of potential output or a ‘new normal’ lower trend rate of growth of productivity.  It is well-known 
that financial crises can have permanent adverse direct effects on the level and possibly also the 
trend growth rate of potential output.  Thinking in terms of a production function or growth 
accounting, there may be direct adverse effects on capital inputs as investment is interrupted, on 
human capital if skills are lost or restructuring makes them redundant, on labour inputs through 
increases in equilibrium unemployment, and on TFP if R & D is cut back or innovative firms cannot 
get finance. 
The orthodox view, embraced by OECD and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) among others, 
is that there has been a big levels effect but no impact on future trend growth such that log labour 
productivity will maintain a trend path parallel to what would have been expected in 2007.9  Thus 
OBR (2014a) believes that the future long run trend rate of growth of labour productivity will be 2.2 
per cent per year while the current output gap is only about 1 per cent of GDP.10  The estimates by 
Ollivaud and Turner (2014) reported in Table 6 show a levels effect on labour productivity of 9.1 per 
cent most of which comes from a fall in TFP of 7.4 per cent.  At the same time, these authors 
estimate that the output gap is only 1.3 per cent of GDP so the adverse effect is expected to be 
permanent.  It is striking that the estimated impact of the crisis on the level of TFP is much larger 
than that in other countries. 
The costs of a banking crisis in terms of foregone output are now much more generally recognised to 
be very large.  At least in retrospect, it seems clear that de-regulation in the financial sector went too 
far and that, subsequently, excessive leverage risked a banking crisis which could have a serious 
adverse effect on potential output.  In particular, given market failures arising from asymmetric 
information and moral hazard, banks should have been required to have much higher ratios of loss-
absorbing equity capital to reduce the risks of bank failures.  This might well imply that capital would 
have been more expensive and real GDP a bit lower as a result.  Nevertheless, since the output 
losses are so substantial, this is probably a price worth paying.  For example, the benefit-cost 
analysis in Miles et al. (2013) suggests that optimal bank capital is close to 20% of risk-weighted 
assets at an annual cost of about 1.5 per cent of GDP. 
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 This would actually be quite similar to what analysis based on time-series econometrics suggests for the 
experience of the United States in the context of the massive financial crisis during the Great Depression (Ben-
David et al., 2003). 
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 This projection implies that the sustainable trend rate of growth pre-crisis was a little below the end-point 
calculation of the growth rate between 1995 and 2007 reported in Table 1. 
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It is important to know whether the orthodox view that the ‘productivity puzzle’ basically reflects a 
large levels effect, resulting from the financial crisis and accruing primarily through a one-off decline 
in TFP, is correct.  A more pessimistic interpretation would be that it is partly the result of a 
slowdown in trend labour productivity growth.  A more optimistic interpretation would be that some 
of what is now counted as a permanent effect will actually be regained as the economy returns to 
normal.  There is still considerable uncertainty about these issues, especially with regard to TFP.   A 
recent overview suggested that as much as 6 percentage points (3/8ths) of the shortfall is currently 
unexplained (Barnett et al., 2014) but found quite strong evidence that the crisis had led to 
impairment of resource reallocation, and thus had decreased efficiency as well as holding back 
implementation of innovations, while also noting that there is little evidence of spare capacity and 
that labour hoarding seems unlikely still to be a strong factor.  The decline in TFP seems quite large 
(by at least 4 percentage points) compared with what might be predicted on the basis of earlier 
financial crises (Oulton, 2013a) but the uncertainty engendered by the crisis has been very severe 
and this may well have undermined productivity performance (Bloom, 2014).   
Thus, it still seems possible to fear that trend TFP growth will be weaker in future or to hope that as 
uncertainty among businesses recedes and normal patterns of entry and exit return there will be an 
increase in efficiency that will repair some of the damage. The economy probably had a small 
positive output gap in 2007 but not big enough seriously to distort perceptions of pre-crisis 
performance.11  It can fairly be pointed out that a more heavily regulated and somewhat smaller 
financial services sector may well contribute less to productivity growth in future than in the pre-
crisis years but it is not correct to see its pre-crisis contribution as a mirage.12  There has been no 
dramatic change in supply-side policy of the kind that the UK experienced in the crisis of the 1930s 
which saw the abandonment of free trade and a serious weakening of competition in product 
markets that took decades fully to reverse and undermined productivity performance in the decades 
after World War II (Crafts, 2012).  On the contrary, policy settings in areas such as competition and 
product market regulation which served the economy well prior to 2007 are still in place (Crafts 
2015b).  There is no obvious reason to suppose that future productivity growth should be much 
lower unless it is feared that technological progress at the frontier will become weaker. 
By 2007, the share of manufacturing in UK employment had fallen to 10.1 per cent from 27.2 per 
cent in 1975 and 17.8 per cent in 1990.  The crisis has re-opened the question of the desirability of 
this de-industrialization.  For example, in many speeches in 2009 Peter Mandelson declared that 
there should be ‘less financial engineering, more real engineering’.  It is quite possible that, if the 
share of manufacturing in the economy were to rise, labour productivity growth would increase; in 
the pre-crisis period the growth rate of real output per hour worked in manufacturing exceeded that 
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 The output gap is always measured with difficulty but the best guess is that it was about 2 per cent in 2007 
according to the detailed analysis in Murray (2014). 
12
 It is sometimes claimed that mismeasurement of financial services output distorted the pre-crisis picture; 
Oulton (2013b) shows that any such effect is very small - at most 0.1 percent per year during 2000-2007.  
According to the EUKLEMS database, output per hour worked grew at 4.23 per cent per year between 1197 
and 2007 and, weighted by the sector’s value-added share, contributed 0.19 per cent per year to total labour 
productivity growth. 
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in market services by about 1 percentage point per year.13  However, there is as yet no sign of an 
upturn in manufacturing’s share of economic activity and it is difficult to think of a credible scenario 
in which it could occur (Foresight, 2013).  Manufacturing was 9.5 per cent of GDP and 9.8 per cent of 
employment in the first three quarters of 2014.  The idea that there is a route to significantly faster 
growth through re-industrialization any time soon seems far-fetched. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that pre-crisis industrial policies could be significantly 
improved upon and the Coalition Government certainly thought so in The Plan for Growth (HMT and 
BIS, 2011).  Seasoned observers know well that during the ‘post-Thatcher consensus’ there were 
persistent weaknesses in horizontal industrial policies relating to education, infrastructure, 
regulation, taxation and, especially, innovation policy all of which might extract a growth penalty 
according to new growth economics. 
The quality of education is generally seen as important for growth and there is evidence that 
cognitive skills matter.  As measured by international test scores, UK schooling has been flat-lining 
recently and is well below the top performers as measured by OECD’s PISA scores.  The average for 
maths and science in 2012 was 504 compared with 503 in 2009 and 505 in 2006.  Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2012) estimate that increasing this score by 25 points – a bit less than half the 
difference between the UK and Singapore - would raise the long-run growth rate by about 0.3-0.4 
percentage points.  It remains to be seen whether the Gove reforms will improve matters. 
There is consensus in the literature that R and D has a strong impact on TFP growth and has a very 
high social rate of return, on average 2 to 3 times as high as the median private rate of return of 
around 20 to 25 per cent (Frontier Economics, 2014).  More generally, the process of innovation is 
exposed to market failures and there is a strong prima facie case for government intervention.  This 
has long been recognised by UK governments yet the UK level of R and D (1.73 per cent of GDP of 
which business R and D comprised 1.10 per cent of GDP) is less than half that of the biggest spending 
OECD countries (OECD, 2014).  Government support for R and D continues to be underfunded. 
From a growth perspective, the UK has been investing too little in infrastructure.  The UK net stock 
of public capital relative to GDP fell substantially between 1980 and 2010 (from 64% to 36%).  To 
maintain the level of public capital to GDP at a growth-maximizing level, public investment of about 
2.7 per cent of GDP per year would be needed but UK investment has fallen from 2.4 to 1.9 per cent 
of GDP since 2010 and during 2014/15 through 2018/19 this will fall to an average of 1.8 per cent 
(OBR, 2014b).  This is an unhelpful policy development. 
Reforming taxation with a view to increasing the growth rate would generally entail reducing 
marginal direct tax rates and a serious reform of corporate taxation while increasing indirect and 
property taxes (Mirrlees et al., 2011).  Relatively low statutory UK corporate tax rates and increases 
in VAT seem to suggest this advice has been heeded.  However, calculations of UK Effective Average 
and Effective Marginal Tax Rates (taking into account capital allowances) indicate that by 2015 the 
former will be 20.3 and the latter 18.9 per cent which would leave the UK as 29th among OECD 
economies (Bilicka and Devereux, 2012) while the VAT tax base remains very narrow.   
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 However, a smaller financial services sector might not help; it should be noted that labour productivity 
growth in financial services was appreciably higher than in manufacturing, 4.23 per cent per year compared 
with 3.48 per cent per year in the ten years to 2007 (EU KLEMS, 2011). 
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Not all UK regulation is productivity friendly.  Recent research has emphasized that UK land-use 
planning reduce labour productivity significantly both by making land unduly expensive and by 
restricting city size which means that agglomeration economies are foregone and spatial adjustment  
is impeded – successful British cities are too small (Leunig and Overman, 2008).  One of the 
implications of the planning rules is an implicit regulatory tax rate of around 300 per cent which 
makes office space in cities like Leeds and Manchester much more expensive than even New York 
and San Francisco (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008).  Similarly, planning policy by making land for retailing 
very expensive and by constraining retailers to choose less productive sites has reduced the level of 
TFP in supermarkets by about 32 per cent in post-1996 compared with pre-1988 stores, thereby 
significantly reducing the rate of TFP growth in the sector (Cheshire et al., 2015).  The National 
Planning Policy Framework introduced in 2012 addresses some of these issues by introducing a 
presumption in favour of development where there is no local plan but still retains the Green Belt 
and did not liberalize the rules for retailing.  This represents only a timid step in a direction 
favourable to growth – a bit underwhelming compared with the rhetoric of The Plan for Growth. 
The Plan for Growth (HMT and BIS, 2011) had four declared aims, namely, to create the most 
competitive tax system in the G20, to make the UK one of the best places in Europe to start, finance 
and grow a business, to encourage investment and exports as a route to a more balanced economy, 
and to create a more educated workforce that is the most flexible in Europe.  This can largely be 
construed as continuity in terms of signalling an intention to improve horizontal industrial policies 
and this impression is strengthened by much of the detailed discussion in the document.   
Nevertheless, the aspiration to achieve a ‘more balanced economy’ did mark something of a change 
in response to the shock of the financial crisis, clearly represented a desire to strengthen sectors 
which were deemed to central to these goals through an ‘industrial strategy’, and has entailed a 
move back towards more selective industrial policies albeit without the corporatist overtones of the 
1970s or any grand ambition to make reforms that would develop a ‘co-ordinated market economy’ 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
The distinctive feature marking a modest break from the pre-crisis years is the ‘industrial strategy’ 
which aims to promote growth through boosting eleven selected sectors and to stimulate the 
advance and commercialization of eight selected technologies (Rhodes, 2014). The government is in 
the process of developing ‘strategic partnerships’ in key sectors with growth potential to address 
market failures, especially with regard to innovation, and to underpin investment (BIS, 2012).  These 
entail a high-level forum, skills improvement initiatives, and public support for research centres.  An 
interesting component of this approach is the funding of ‘catapult centres’ which aim to enhance 
business capabilities in the exploitation of new technologies.  Industrial strategy expenditure is 
running at about £2 billion per year. 
Although this is a return to ‘selective industrial policy’, it is not really ‘back to the 1970s’.  Back then, 
there is no doubt that such policies were a very expensive failure characterized by costly support for 
declining industries and vain attempts to compete with the United States in high-technology 
industries.  The current approach is on a much smaller scale and is closer to ‘soft industrial policy’ 
with the government as a facilitator that seeks to address coordination failures rather than to ‘pick 
winners’ (Warwick, 2013).  In particular, the aim is to address market failures associated with the so-
called ‘valley of death’ in terms of the phase of technology platform research (which often entails 
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high risk, high cost and provision of public goods) that comes between basic research and applied R 
and D (Tassey, 2014). 
It is difficult to believe that the industrial strategy really tackles the most important reasons for the 
business (and manufacturing) innovation shortfall which the Coalition wishes to remedy and in this 
respect it is no different from earlier governments.  In particular, R and D is an activity which is 
vulnerable to short-termism and impatient capital where future returns are myopically discounted - 
a problem more likely to be found in a ‘liberal market economy’ than a ‘co-ordinated market 
economy’.  It has been regularly documented that UK equity markets are notably short-termist 
(Miles, 1993; Black and Fraser, 2000; Davies et al., 2014) and that this has adverse effects on long-
term innovation related investment (Bond et al., 2003; Hughes, 2013).  It may be that to address 
these issues quite significant institutional reform is required and that this is the next step in re-
thinking supply-side policy. 
A return to selective industrial policy has also to take account of the ‘2nd Unbundling’ which is based 
on ICT and has been taking place in the last 25 years or so.  This entails the development of complex 
supply chains with many production stages in different locations based on the reduction in 
coordination costs facilitated by the new technology (Baldwin, 2012).  Manufactured products are 
produced but the fabrication of them does not necessarily contribute a high proportion of the value 
added which may actually accrue in service activities both pre-and post fabrication.14  In this new 
phase of globalization manufacturing activity has been shifting from high income countries to 
developing countries, notably to China, and many jobs in countries like the UK have become 
vulnerable to offshoring (Blinder and Krueger, 2013).  The value-added contribution of low and 
medium-skilled workers in advanced countries to global value chains in manufacturing fell sharply 
between 1995 and 2008 from 34.9 to 22.1 per cent (Table 7).  The aim of 21st-century industrial 
policy will presumably be to try to anchor high value-added segments of the supply-chain in the UK, 
including activities conventionally taken to be, and perhaps measured as, services. 
These developments have implications that change the optimal composition of industrial policies 
compared with the less globalized world in the earlier technological era of the 1970s (Baldwin and 
Evenett, 2012).  First, with regard to selective policies, it may be necessary to re-think the notion of 
giving support to particular manufacturing sectors and think instead in terms of interventions that 
influence the location and co-location of economic activities.  Second, the increased mobility of 
some factors of production means that it may be important not only to consider externalities but 
how far these will be internalized to the UK.  This means, for example, that compared with earlier 
times, the weight of horizontal policies should tilt towards human capital rather than transferable 
technology.  Third, corporate taxation has to be designed for a world in which there is greater tax 
competition which typically implies lower marginal rates than in a closed-economy setting. 
Perhaps most important of all is to recognize the value of increasing the ‘stickiness’ of economic 
activity by making alternative locations less good substitutes.  This results from advantages that 
cannot easily be replicated elsewhere.  In particular, this suggests that policies to nurture successful 
agglomerations deserve a high priority.  It may be appropriate for the British government to follow 
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 In the well-known example of the 2007 Nokia smart phone, 2% of the retail price came from final assembly 
and 33% from the cost of physical components with the rest accruing from a variety of service inputs (Ali-Yrkkö 
et al., 2011) 
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the lead of the Dutch (CPB, 2010) and consider what a successful portfolio of British cities would look 
like in future and how this can be underpinned.  This calls for an approach different from that of 
traditional industrial policy with its emphasis on subsidies to physical investment or promoting 
particular manufacturing industries.  Instead, it will be important to develop well-designed transport 
infrastructure and land-use planning policies.  Unfortunately, these are areas in which British policies 
leave a lot to be desired. 
V. Future Issues 
A remarkable recent development is the revival of interest in the concept of ‘secular stagnation’, 
originally popularized by Hansen (1939).  Hansen argued that the American economy faced a crisis of 
under investment and deficient aggregate demand since investment opportunities and significantly 
diminished in the face of the closing of the frontier, declining population growth and a slowdown in 
technological progress.  It was as if the United States was faced with a lower natural rate of growth 
to which the rate of growth of the capital stock would adjust through a permanently lower rate of 
investment.  According to pessimists, the problem that future generations now face is that the rate 
of technological progress will be much slower (Cowen, 2011).  Once again, as in the 1980s, the 
prospect of a ‘new normal’ of lower growth is much discussed (Sentance, 2013). 
Mainstream opinion among American economists rejects the secular stagnation thesis (Fernald, 
2014).  It is true that projections of growth rates over the next 10 to 15 years in the United States 
have been reduced somewhat since the Great Recession and it is generally accepted that 
employment growth and the rate of improvement of labour quality will be slow down.  However, 
even Gordon (2014), often cited as a notorious pessimist, expects labour productivity growth at 1.3 
percent per year based on TFP growth around the average of the last 40 years.  Future technological 
progress is notoriously hard to predict – 1980s’ pessimism was, of course, derailed by ICT - but there 
is quite possibly scope for a significant acceleration in TFP growth since a major legacy of the ICT 
revolution will be much higher productivity in undertaking R & D (Mokyr, 2014). 
It seems quite likely that the impact of computerization will intensify in the near future.  Frey and 
Osborne (2013) estimate that 47 per cent of 2010 employment in the United States has at least a 70 
per cent chance of being computerized by 2035 with these probabilities being strongly negatively 
correlated with wages and educational attainment of workers.  Job polarization has been a striking 
feature of employment patterns in advanced economies in the last 30 years or so with the 
percentages of high-skilled (professional, managerial etc.) and low-skilled (labourers, low-education 
service sector workers) employment rising while middle-skilled (clerical, blue-collar) employment 
has been falling.  Estimates reported in Table 8 for an aggregate of 16 European countries show a fall 
of 9.27 percentage points in the share of their ‘middling occupations’ between 1993 and 2010 
against rises for ‘high-paying’ and ‘low-paying’.  The model estimated by Goos et al. (2014) suggests 
that this has been almost entirely due to technological change rather than to offshoring with the 
occupations that have been shrinking being those which entail tasks which are routine and codifiable 
and have been most amenable to computerization (Autor, 2014). 
Future advances will come in machine learning which will be applied in mobile robotics as hitherto 
non-routine tasks are turned into well-defined problems in particular using big data which will allow 
substitution of (much cheaper) robots for labour in a wide range of low-wage service occupations.  
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Tasks which will probably not be susceptible to computerization are those involving perception and 
manipulation, creative intelligence, or social intelligence.  This suggests that the issue to be 
confronted is actually not so much an absence of technological change but its factor-saving bias 
which could entail major problems in the labour market. 
If future productivity growth is undermined by a slowdown in technological progress, it becomes all 
the more important that supply-side policy is well-designed to take advantage of what opportunities 
there are and to reduce productivity gaps with other advanced economies.  Market failures in 
finance and innovation are serious and need to be corrected by appropriate policy interventions, as 
experience since the 1980s has confirmed, but it is natural to worry about the effectiveness of 
government in addressing the issues (Mayhew, 2013).  This is, of course, not a new worry but it gains 
additional purchase with the relative decline of the two major political parties.  Government failure 
is likely to loom larger for the next generation. 
In this vein, the LSE Growth Commission (2013) recently suggested that failures in the institutional 
architecture are at the roots of the persistent and serious failure in UK investment in public capital 
which has continued under the present government.  (Vote-seeking politicians cannot be expected 
to make good policy or respect cost-benefit analysis).  They propose a solution in terms of several 
new institutions with powers delegated by parliament with statutory responsibility for strategy, an 
infrastructure planning commission with responsibility for delivery and an infrastructure bank to 
provide finance. 
Whether this solution is the best one or not, the diagnosis is surely correct and applies quite widely 
to supply-side policy.15  Supply-side policy is exposed to government failure but this has not been 
addressed by institutional innovation in the UK.  In other aspects of public policy, it is accepted that 
politicians cannot be trusted to deliver efficient outcomes.  Recent examples include the delegation 
of monetary policy to an independent Bank of England, the establishment of NICE to consider the 
costs and benefits of new drugs, the de-politicization of competition policy by removing the 
ministerial prerogative to over-rule the competition authorities, and the Office of Budget 
Responsibility to evaluate macroeconomic forecasts and the implications of government policy for 
fiscal sustainability.  With regard to the politics of protectionism, we long ago signed up to 
international treaties (GATT/WTO/EU) which remove political discretion and which have guarded 
against a repeat of the policy errors of the 1930s. 
At a minimum, it may be necessary to develop serious surveillance of supply-side policy.  An agency 
tasked with this function might be asked inter alia to require government departments to provide 
information for the public domain and to audit government policies for their effects on medium-
term productivity performance.  It might also be asked to benchmark supply-side policies against 
international best practice and be expected to provide a regular strategic assessment and evidence 
papers.16  A reconsideration of the framework in which supply-side policy is generated is made all 
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 For example, with regard to investment in roads a more attractive solution may be to make the road 
network a regulated utility with statutory obligations, a regulatory asset base and a revenue stream, a 
proposal from which the government has backed away. 
16
 An example of a somewhat similar remit is the Australian government’s independent research and advisory 
body, the Australian Productivity Commission. 
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the more urgent by the return of selective industrial policy, the recent upsurge of populism, and the 
increased likelihood of indecisive elections. 
VI. Conclusions 
A claim that the message from the last 30 years is ‘Onwards and upwards!’ is surely over the top but 
nevertheless there has been some good news since the 1980s.  Most obviously, economic growth is 
an area where economics has a lot more to offer than used to be the case.  Despite entertaining 
some unpersuasive ideas, on balance, the endogenous-growth revolution has produced both richer 
empirics and important practical implications which can help the design of much more effective 
supply-side policy. 
The most striking change in thinking about productivity performance is the widespread recognition 
that competition really matters and can be an antidote to problems such as incompetent 
management and dysfunctional industrial relations which seemed completely intractable 40 years 
ago.  If there is to be a return to a much more pro-active industrial policy in the UK, it is important 
that adverse implications for competition are minimized. 
In the 20 years before the financial crisis, the UK’s economic growth performance was quite 
respectable by international standards and stronger than might have been generally expected in the 
1980s.  This period seemed to see the end of British relative economic decline and the economic 
reforms of the Thatcher years deserve some credit for this.  The ICT revolution did deliver and, as a 
pleasant surprise, the UK turned out to be much better at exploiting its opportunities than had been 
the case with Fordist manufacturing.  At the same time, supply-side policy in the late 20th and early 
21st centuries has left a good deal to be desired with persistent weaknesses in education, 
infrastructure, and innovation policies.  This would not be surprising to Thatcher’s 1980s’ critics. 
More recently, however, there have been some dark clouds and the optimism of a decade ago has 
evaporated.  The ‘productivity puzzle’ of the last few years remains a worrying conundrum and may 
yet herald a period of weaker trend growth.  However, fears about long-term ‘secular stagnation’, 
based on the end of innovation as we have known it, seem overdone.  The problem is much more 
likely to be the factor-saving bias of technological progress based on computerization of jobs than a 
drying-up of productivity growth. 
The crisis has provoked renewed interest in industrial policy or, as the Coalition government would 
have it, ‘industrial strategy’.  This is understandable and perhaps desirable and is unlikely to take us 
back to the 1970s.  Nevertheless, it remains somewhat unclear what the design of a new industrial 
policy should be in a world of global supply chains and mobile capital.  Moreover, this is an area 
where it is right to fear ‘government failure’, especially in an era of populist politics.  This suggests 
that the time is right to pay attention to a long overdue overhaul of the institutional architecture of 
supply-side policymaking. 
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Table 1. Rates of Growth of Real GDP/Person and Real GDP/Hour Worked (% per year) 
 Y/P Y/HW 
1950-1973   
France   4.02   5.02 
Germany   5.02   5.85 
UK   2.42   2.85 
USA   2.45   2.56 
1973-1995   
France   1.61   2.85 
Germany   1.92   3.01 
UK   1.75   2.76 
USA   1.80   1.28 
1995-2007   
France   1.64   1.67 
Germany   1.55   1.78 
UK   2.87   2.52 
USA   2.18   2.12 
2007-2013   
France -0.46   0.23 
Germany   0.94   0.30 
UK -0.87 -0.51 
USA   0.14   1.22 
 
Note: Germany is West Germany prior to 1995. 
Source: The Conference Board (2014) 
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Table 2.  GPTs: Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth (% per year) 
 Capital-
Deepening 
TFP Total 
Steam (UK)    
    1760-1830   0.011   0.003   0.014 
    1830-1870 0.18 0.12 0.30 
    1870-1910 0.15 0.16 0.31 
Electricity (USA)    
    1899-1919 0.34 0.06 0.40 
    1919-1929 0.23 0.05 0.28 
ICT (USA)    
    1974-1995 0.41 0.36 0.77 
    1995-2004 0.78 0.72 1.50 
    2004-2012 0.36 0.28 0.64 
 
Memorandum Item: Real Price Falls (%) 
Steam Horsepower  
     1760-1830 39.1 
     1830-1870 60.8 
     1870-1910 50.0 
Electric Motors (Sweden)  
     1901-1925 38.5 
ICT Equipment  
     1970-1989 80.6 
     1989-2007 77.5 
 
Notes:  
Growth accounting estimates based on the following equation: 
Δ(Y/L)/(Y/L)  = αΔ(KO/L)/(KO/L)  +  βΔ(KGPT/L)/(KGPT/L) + ω(ΔA/A)GPT  +  φ(ΔA/A)O                                     
This equation decomposes the sources of labour productivity growth into contributions from two 
types of capital, GPT capital and other capital each weighted by their income shares, β and α, and 
two types of TFP growth in the production of GPT equipment and in the rest of the economy, each 
weighted by their shares in gross output, ω and φ.  Thus, the GPT is allowed to have impacts on 
labour productivity growth both through a capital-deepening effect and through own TFP growth. 
Sources:   
Growth accounting: Crafts (2002) (2004) and Byrne et al. (2013). 
Price falls: Crafts (2004), Edquist (2010) and Oulton (2012). 
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Table 3.  Real GDP/Head (UK = 100 in each year) 
 USA West Germany France 
1870   76.6   57.6   58.8 
1913 107.7   74.1   70.8 
1929 125.3   73.6   85.6 
1950 137.8   61.7   74.7 
1979 142.7 115.9 111.1 
2007 124.3 101.9   87.4 
2013 132.2 107.8   89.8 
 
Notes: estimates refer to Germany from 1870 to 1937.  Purchasing power parity estimates in 
$1990GK for 1870 through 1979 and in $2005EKS from Penn World Table for 2007 and 2013. 
Sources: Maddison (2010) and The Conference Board (2014); West Germany in 2007 and 2013 
calculated from Statistiches Bundesamt Deutschland 2014. 
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Table 4. Contributions to Growth in Market Sector, 1950-2007 (% per year). 
 Education Capital per 
Hour Worked 
TFP Labour 
Productivity 
Growth 
France     
1950-1973 0.5 1.7 3.0 5.2 
1973-1995 0.2 1.2 1.5 2.9 
1995-2007 0.3 0.7 0.9 1.9 
Germany     
1950-1973 0.4 2.3 2.5 5.2 
1973-1995 0.3 1.1 1.3 2.7 
1995-2007 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.7 
UK     
1950-1973 0.5 1.5 1.4 3.4 
1973-1995 0.4 0.9 1.3 2.6 
1995-2007 0.4 1.2 1.0 2.6 
United States     
1950-1973 0.3 0.9 1.5 2.7 
1973-1995 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.2 
1995-2007 0.3 1.2 1.1 2.6 
 
Note: labour productivity is measured in terms of output per hour worked. 
Sources:   1950-1995: O’Mahony (1999); 1995-2007: van Ark (2011).  Education contributions from 
1950-1995 are estimated based on years of schooling in Morrisson and Murtin (2009). 
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Table 5.  Labour Productivity Growth in the Market Sector, 1995-2007 (% per year) 
a) Growth Accounting 
 Labour 
Quality 
ICTK/HW Non-ICT 
K/HW 
TFP Labour 
Productivity 
Growth 
UK 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.0 2.6 
France 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.9 
Germany 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.7 
USA 0.3 0.9 0.3 1.1 2.6 
 
b) Sectoral Contributions 
 ICT 
Production 
Goods 
Production 
Market 
Services 
Reallocation Labour 
Productivity 
Growth 
UK 0.5 0.7 1.6 -0.2 2.6 
France 0.4 0.8 0.7  0.0 1.9 
Germany 0.5 0.9 0.4 -0.1 1.7 
USA 0.8 0.3 1.8 -0.3 2.6 
 
Source: van Ark (2011) 
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Table 6. Crisis Effect on Level of Potential Output in 2014 (% fall relative to pre-crisis level) 
 Labour 
Productivity 
Due to 
Capital/Worker 
Due to TFP Employment Total 
France         -0.2           -0.3 0.1          -0.9          -1.1 
Germany 0.4 0.5          -0.1          -4.3          -3.9 
UK 9.1 1.7 7.4          -0.5 8.6 
United States 1.8 1.3 0.5 0.7 2.5 
 
Note: Column (1) is based on output per worker. 
Source: Ollivaud and Turner (2014) 
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Table 7.  Factor Shares in Global Value Chains of Manufactures (%) 
 1995 2008 
High Income Countries 73.8 56.0 
     Capital 26.5 21.6 
     High-Skilled Labor 12.4 12.2 
     Medium-Skilled Labor 24.6 17.0 
     Low-Skilled Labor 10.3   5.1 
Other Countries 26.2 44.0 
     Capital 14.4 25.7 
     High-Skilled Labor   1.4   3.1 
     Medium-Skilled Labor   4.1   7.5 
     Low-Skilled Labor   6.2   7.7 
 
Source:  Timmer et al. (2014) 
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Table 8.  Levels and Changes in European Employment, 1993-2010 
 Employment 
Share in 1993 (%) 
Change in Share, 
1993-2010 (%pt.) 
Routine Task 
Intensity 
(mean = 0) 
Offshorability 
(mean = 0) 
High-Paying 
Occupations 
31.67 5.62 -0.72 -0.12 
Middling 
Occupations 
46.75 -9.27 0.69 0.24 
Low-Paying 
Occupations 
21.56 3.65 0.08 0.84 
 
Note: data are averages for 16 European countries. 
Source:  Goos et al. (2014) 
 
